I. INTRODUCTION
T he Great Recession caused personal income to fall sharply in 2009. States responded by cutting spending and raising taxes to accommodate rapid declines in state revenues, accompanied by rising service demands (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2013) . In this paper, we separate these conflicting effects and find that state revenue shortfalls led to an overall decrease in spending, with notable reductions in state spending on education and Medicaid.
Our main explanatory variable is "revenue swings," changes in tax revenues from existing state sources. Because states adopt different tax structures, revenue swings can be distinguished from shifts in the demand for government services. For instance, California has a more progressive income tax than Oregon. Thus, California is subject to a steeper drop in income tax revenues per capita compared to Oregon during an economic decline, even if both experience a similar drop in income per capita. Because states vary greatly in the tax instruments they use (e.g., sales, income, or property taxes, etc.), there is great variation across states in revenue swings even after we control for changes in income, unemployment, poverty, and political sentiment.
We examine the effect of revenue swings on state spending and public education and health services, and find that responses to revenue swings occur over long lags. For instance, in 2009, 43 states experienced a per capita negative revenue swing that ranged from $7 to $705, and averaged $222. Our subsequent regressions imply that the $222 per capita negative revenue swing in 2009 led to a $7 per capita reduction in Medicaid spending in 2010. Our empirical model then illustrates how negative revenue swings reduce state balances, which reduces expenditures in subsequent periods as well. Taking into account these lag effects, our estimates imply that the negative revenue swing in 2009 led to additional decreases in Medicaid spending in each successive year. Thus, although the immediate decrease in expenditures is small, we are able to show that this revenue swing has long-term consequences; in particular, we predict that it will ultimately lead to a 1 percent reduction in the adjusted fraction of elderly enrolled in Medicaid, and a $64 cut in Medicaid spending per child beneficiary.
When we examine all state expenditures, we find that spending cuts tend to have a disproportionate effect on education. For instance, our estimates suggest that the negative revenue swing in 2009 did not significantly reduce education spending in 2010, but it led to a $82 per capita cut in long-run state education spending. Only a fraction of this cut is offset by an increase in local education spending. As a result, spending cuts also raise the number of pupils per teacher.
Our results, together with prior economic research, suggest that spending cuts resulting from economic downturns have significant tangible consequences for access to health care and education. These spending cuts fall more heavily on children than the elderly. The differences across spending categories in the severity of cuts during downturns may be attributable to regulations regarding the financing of different public programs, due to the preferences of policy makers, or to the economic costs of these cuts. Understanding which components of state spending are most vulnerable to budget cuts during economic downturns may help in planning for the long-run health and wellbeing of low income populations.
Section II discusses possible explanations for differential changes in spending across state programs in response to revenue shortfalls. Section III describes our empirical framework. The data used for this study is described in Section IV. Section V describes our results.
II. WHAT MOTIVATES STATE SPENDING PRIORITIES IN A RECESSION?
We are interested in how states change spending on both education and health care in response to revenue shortfalls, because these two categories represent the largest competitors for state funding. The bottom portion of Table 1 Articles in the press have expressed concern regarding the harmful consequences of education and Medicaid spending cuts during the most recent downturn. Some K-12 schools reported class sizes ballooning to 40 or more students, and many colleges cancelled multiple courses and raised tuition (Landsberg, 2009; Clark, 2010) . States cancelled discretionary programs for Medicaid recipients, such as optometry, dental care, and speech therapy (Krauss, 2009 ). Provider reimbursement rates were cut, generating a story of a Medicaid patient with cancer who was unable to obtain oncology care and another patient unable to find a surgeon who would accept Medicaid coverage to repair herniated disks (Sack, 2010; Pear, 2011) .
While the cuts in spending reported in the media suggest substantial harm to some beneficiaries of state spending, our analysis will be unable to measure whether the marginal costs of services cut during recessions is lower than the marginal benefit lost from reducing these programs. The reduced form model of state spending that we will estimate only identifies short-and long-run cuts in spending for particular programs in response to a recession. Except for one case, we lack measures of the loss in social welfare resulting from particular cuts. However, we note one potential downside to state budget cuts. In contrast to federal budget rules, states are required to make spending cuts and tax increases in order to satisfy balanced budget rules, which is one of several institutions that states have adopted to ensure fiscal sustainability (Rose, 2010) . That is, balanced budget rules prevent governments from running deficits during downturns to smooth temporary fluctuations in revenues and spending (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Rose, 2010) . Next, we discuss why states may decide to cut certain programs more than others in response to a revenue shortfall. We suggest institutional, political, and economic constraints that may affect which programs are cut, and how education and health care in particular may be affected.
First, we expect a disproportionate share of the cuts to occur in state programs that are not limited by "soft" or "hard" institutional constraints. An example of "hard" constraints are earmarks. For instance, in 2007, 15 out of our 48 states spent only earmarked funds on transportation.
1 Thus, none of these states could cut transportation spending to make up for the revenue losses that accompanied the Great Recession.
Maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements in the federally funded Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) also lead to hard constraints. The MOE requirement specifies that a state must spend 80 percent of a historic level on qualified state expenditures, which include a range of benefits and services for members of needy families.
2 Thus these MOE requirements may limit the amount of welfare spending that states are able to eliminate in the event of a revenue shortfall. Another example of a hard constraint are court orders. For instance, states under court order to improve school conditions are limited in cutting intergovernmental grants to localities (Baicker and Gordon, 2006) . Similarly, states under court order to improve prison conditions may be limited in the amount that they can cut from prisons and prison hospitals (which are included in overall state hospital expenditures) (Boylan and Mocan, 2014) . Previously agreed spending commitments that the state is legally obligated to pay (e.g., interest debt, payments to contractors for ongoing projects, and pensions) are another example of a "hard" constraint.
An example of "soft" constraints is the availability of federal matching funds. For instance, by cutting Medicaid, the state loses the federal matching funds. In contrast, although the federal government mandates that states cover certain population segments in Medicaid and that certain basic medical services must be provided, states have wide discretion in eligibility standards, the range of discretionary services covered, and the level of reimbursement paid to health care providers.
States may find it easier to cut programs that can be financed from multiple sources. For instance, cuts to state education spending could be offset by raising tuition and raising local property taxes. Both the state and the federal government provide funding for education, which is primarily administered at the local level. In contrast, local governments do not provide funding for Medicaid, and states administer the program with some requirements set by the federal government. Therefore, states may be reluctant to cut Medicaid spending, because there are fewer alternative funding sources for this program versus for education. In contrast, there are fewer alternative sources for funding other expenditure categories such as state administration. For these reasons, cuts in education are a particularly attractive way of balancing state budgets (Reschovsky, 2004; Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov, 2005) . Thus, because of the institutional constraints faced by states, we expect the most cuts to occur in education, the least cuts in transportation, and Medicaid cuts somewhere in between.
Second, we expect a disproportionate share of cuts in programs with weak voter support. Individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises (Luttmer, 2001) . In contrast, capital outlays are viewed in the economic literature as a measure of infrastructure spending that contributes to growth (Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2010) . Thus, the political constraints seem again to suggest that transportation cuts are less likely.
Third, we may expect lower levels of cuts to programs that need a constant flow of spending to operate efficiently. Economic studies suggest that temporary cuts in Medicaid for children have long-term repercussions and are socially costly. For instance, Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995) and Gray (2001) find that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates increase infant mortality and the likelihood of low-weight births. Moreover, child health affects adult health, education, and labor outcomes (Case, Fertig, and Paxson, 2005; Currie, 2009) .
By measuring changes in spending across budget categories when state revenues decline, we will be able to observe whether spending cuts are most likely to occur in categories not limited by institutional constraints and whether programs subject to hard constraints (versus soft constraints) are the least likely to experience cuts. We lack data on voter support for different state programs, so we are unable to measure the impact of voter sentiment on state spending decisions. We also are unable to compare the effects of temporary spending cuts across programs. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that either voter preferences or the need to maintain spending for efficiency purposes also influence which programs are targeted by states for spending cuts during a revenue decline.
III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We seek to quantify how periodic deteriorations in state finances influence spending on health, education, and welfare. In this section we introduce a reduced form model of state spending. The model is not a structural one based on individual behavior, which would require measurements of behavior for both voters and state legislators. Instead, the model is data driven. We will demonstrate that we can measure both the short-and long-run effects of downturns on spending components without specifying a complicated lag structure and losing numerous degrees of freedom.
Our two main explanatory variables in this paper are revenue swings and changes in lagged balances. Revenue swings are changes in revenues from state sources, minus the projected impact of legislated changes in taxes and fees.
3 This measure is derived from budget offices' revenue estimates and therefore includes forecast errors. Balances are the balance in the previous year, plus current surpluses. Despite balanced budget requirements, negative revenue swings often lead to deficits carried into the next fiscal year. 4 Therefore, a state's difference between revenues and expenditures in the subsequent year (the lagged change in balances) is also an explanatory variable of interest.
Revenue swings and lagged balances define a budget identity faced by the state (see Appendix A). In the regressions, this identity leads the coefficient on revenue swings 3 Other papers have examined which expenditures programs are affected by the business cycle (for instance, Hines Jr., Hoynes, and Krueger, 2001; Hercowitz and Strawczynski, 2004; Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov, 2005) . However, we expect the business cycle to affect both revenues and the demand for government services. Thus, without a measure of revenue swings it is difficult to attribute changes in expenditures to revenue shortfalls versus changes in the demand for government services. In our paper we examine a much larger portion of state budgets (general revenues versus just general fund revenues) over a much longer time interval .
4
"Not only is it difficult in some states to determine the constitutional or statutory authority (for the balanced budget requirements), but often it is also unclear what the enforcement mechanism is" (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010, p. 10) . 4 "Not only is it difficult in some states to determine the constitutional or statutory authority (for the balanced budget requirements), but often it is also unclear what the enforcement mechanism is" (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010, p. 10 (nominal per capita income growth was 0.08 percent). Note that because California personal income taxes are highly progressive, a small change in average personal income can have a large effect on personal income tax revenues. For instance, a drastic reduction in realized capital gains accompanied by a modest increase in wages can lead to a small change in personal income, but to a drastic reduction in personal income tax revenues.
In contrast, Oregon had a $81 positive income tax revenue swing in 2009. There are a variety of factors that can explain why Oregon had a positive swing in a year when California had a negative swing. First, Oregon had a better economy than California (nominal income per capita growth between 2007 and 2008 was 1.4 percent in Oregon versus 0.08 percent in California). Second, Oregon has a much less progressive system of personal income taxes than California. For instance, Oregon is one of the six states that allows taxpayers to deduct their federal income taxes from their state taxable income, which reduces the amount wealthier Oregonians must pay to the state versus lower income residents. Thus a drastic reduction in realized capital gains accompanied by a modest increase in wages is less likely to lead to a decrease in personal income revenues in Oregon than in California.
Our example illustrated how the relation between changes in incomes per capita and revenue swings differs among states, because not all personal income taxes are equally progressive. In fact taxes differ among states in many ways; for instance, some states do not have a personal income, sales, corporate income, or property tax, and many state sales taxes exempt food. 6 We also cannot conclude from our discussion that Oregon has a less volatile tax base, since income taxes represent a much larger share of state tax revenues in Oregon than in California. Consequently, we expect the revenue swings to differ among states in ways that are not easily summarized by the characteristics of the tax system. In this paper we examine how state expenditures and specifically spending on health, education, and welfare respond to revenue swings and changes in balances. In order to allow states to respond asymmetrically to revenue shortfalls versus revenue windfalls, we split revenue swings into positive and negative components. Positive revenue swings are the positive component of revenue swings, and negative revenue swings are the absolute value of the negative component of revenue swings. We decompose the change in balances in the previous period in a similar manner.
Asymmetric response to revenue shortfalls versus windfalls lead to government expenditures comprising a larger share of the economy over time. This phenomenon has been studied mostly at the country level (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Hercowitz and Strawczynski, 2004) . This asymmetric response to spending cuts has been also identified in cases where the federal government cuts grants for highway spending (Gamkhar, 2000) and when states cut aid to counties (Stine, 1994) . Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) cite several studies linking this phenomenon to political and institutional mechanisms. Buchanan and Wagner (1978) suggest that governments conduct countercyclical policies during recessions, but high tax revenues during expansions make it difficult for governments to resist special interest groups when efforts are made to reduce spending symmetrically.
We estimate the reduced-form regression depicted by Equation (1),
where the dependent variable Y it is a budget or expenditure component in state i and year t, X it are the primary explanatory variables (positive and negative revenue swings, increases and decreases in balances in the previous period), W it are controls, and q t Y represents year effects. The controls include changes in income and other characteristics that have been shown to influence a state's demand for government services. State fixed effects are implicit since we estimate the regressions in first differences. The regressions are population-weighted. Estimation of the model in first-differences accounts for factors influencing both the tax structure of a state and government spending decisions. For example, states that rely more on a progressive income tax for revenue may also prefer to spend more on programs that benefit the poor. The first-differences also help control for changes in the power of stakeholders in states that may influence spending decisions. For instance, high state representation of pharmacists in the American Pharmaceutical Association and higher numbers of pharmacists and physicians per capita have been associated with higher Medicaid drug spending (Pracht and Moore, 2003) . After the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with tobacco companies, states with major tobacco producers were found to allocate low amounts of funds received towards health spending (Sloan et al., 2005) . Higher spending by state lobbyists for education has also been associated with higher salaries for primary and secondary teachers (Hoyt and Toma, 1993) .
The four budget components that serve as dependent variables in Equation (1) are: ∆Expenditures, the change in general expenditures; Tax Cuts, the enacted tax cuts or if negative, the enacted tax increases; Grants Cuts, the decrease in intergovernmental grants or if negative, the increase; and ∆Balances the change in general balances. We refer to these four terms as the "budget components," because these four terms must always add up to the sum of revenue swings and changes in balances in the previous period (see Appendix A) . Thus the coefficients can be interpreted both as level changes and percentage changes. For instance, we find in Table 2 that a $1 positive revenue swing leads to $0.421 in spending increases, $0.04 in tax cuts, $0.019 in intergovernmental revenue reduction, and $0.556 in increases in balances. Note that $0.421 + $0.04 − $0.019 + $0.556 = $1, and thus the terms can be interpreted as percentages; that is, 42.1 percent of positive revenue swings are allocated towards increases in expenditures. Again, this adding up property is not a constraint in the estimation, but a consequence of the way the terms are defined.
Note that our empirical framework allows a revenue swing in year t to change spending growth in all future years. For instance, a revenue swing in year t affects growth in balances in year t, which in turn affects growth in expenditures in year t + 1. Thus, we need to take into account the growth in balances and expenditures in all subsequent years to determine the long-run effect of a revenue swing. Fortunately, calculating the long-run effect does not require that one include all lagged values of revenue swings in previous periods. Instead one can compute the long-run effects of a revenue swing using just the coefficients obtained from estimating Equation (1), where the dependent variables are ∆Expenditures and ∆Balances. Appendix B contains the specific formula that can be applied to these coefficients to obtain the long-run effect of a revenue swing on expenditures. The formula results from the fact that the budget components are formally linked to each other, due to the budget constraint faced by each state's government.
IV. DATA
We measure the effects of revenue swings on state expenditures, with particular interest in the consequences for spending on health, education, and welfare. Our analyses span the years 1989 to 2012, with data drawn from multiple sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau, the National Association of State Budget Officers, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the National Governors Association, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
7 Appendix C documents the sources of our data. All monetary variables are expressed in real (2009) per capita values using the consumer price index and state population estimates.
A. Primary Explanatory Variables
Revenue swings are changes in revenues from state sources minus enacted changes in revenues, where enacted changes in revenues are legislated changes in taxes and fees. For instance, tax revenues for Connecticut in 2009 were $612 per capita lower than in 2008. However, the state passed a variety of new revenue measures that the state budget office had projected would have raised revenues by $94 per capita. Thus, the revenue swing of $612 + $94 = $706 is the decrease in revenues from existing state sources. The enacted changes in revenues is equivalent to the budget component Tax Cuts, which is one of the four budget components in Equation (1). So, in 2009, Connecticut had a −$94 Tax Cut.
Changes in balances are the difference between general revenues and general expenditures. Since we use the data from the Census of Governments, rainy day funds are included in balances. General revenues are funds used for all state programs except for utilities, liquor stores, and insurance trusts. General revenues are split into revenues from state sources and intergovernmental grants. 
B. Dependent Variables
We begin by examining how revenue swings and lagged changes in balances affect changes in the four components that comprise a state budget -namely, changes in general expenditures, enacted taxes, changes in intergovernmental grants, and changes in balances. For the years 1989 through 2012, we then subdivide general expenditures into expenditure components: education, health spending, other welfare, capital and transportation, public safety, administration, unrestricted local support, and other. 9 The two major components of state health care spending are Medicaid and hospital expenditures. We therefore subdivide health expenditures into Medicaid, hospital, and other health spending. Other health spending includes a wide range of programs conducted by state health departments. 10 The general expenditures components only cover local spending which is financed by the state government, although we examine spending from other sources when we examine K-12 spending.
We examine in greater detail how spending and services in health, welfare, and education are impacted by revenue swings and changes in balances. Specifically, we examine the adjusted fraction of elderly enrolled in Medicaid, the adjusted fraction of children enrolled in Medicaid, Medicaid spending per elderly enrolled in Medicaid, and Medicaid spending per child enrolled in Medicaid. We then take a closer look at Medicaid spending per enrollee for service categories which are frequently discussed in the literature and the popular press. For both the elderly and children, we examine spending per enrollee on capitated care, hospital services, physician services, drugs, and dental expenditures. For the elderly, we also examine nursing home expenditures.
To measure the effect of recessions on outcomes for vulnerable populations, we are able to examine the percent of teen mothers with low-weight (less than 2,500 grams) births as a dependent variable. For other welfare, we examine the maximum monthly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/TANF benefit for a family of three.
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We examine K-12 state spending, K-12 spending from all sources (state, local, federal, balances), and the pupil to teacher ratio. We focus specifically on K-12 spending, because cuts to higher education spending can be partially addressed with increases in college tuition. While higher tuition is a burden on students, these costs should in many cases be recuperated through higher earnings post-graduation.
We compute the adjusted fraction of children and elderly on Medicaid using individual data from the Current Population Survey March supplement for the years 1996 through 2012 (King et al., 2010) . By using individual data we control for changes in characteristics of the population, so that our enrollment measures reflect changes in eligibility requirements. For instance, the adjusted fraction of children enrolled in Medicaid is the coefficient on the state-year fixed effect when we regress the likelihood that a child is enrolled in Medicaid on individual controls and state-year fixed effects.
12

C. Control Variables
We explicitly control for income per capita when measuring the effects of revenue swings. As per capita income declines in a recession, the demand for Medicaid rises, increasing spending per capita. This study instead focuses on measuring the changes in spending decisions that states make when they have less access to revenues. Overall observed spending on Medicaid and other health services may rise in a recession as individuals lose jobs and enroll in Medicaid for insurance coverage. But this overall rise in spending may mask important budgetary cuts in health programs that states must make when faced with a revenue shortfall. States have generally targeted provider payment cuts and prescription drug controls during economic downturns. But as a last resort, they turn to Medicaid benefit and eligibility cuts to control spending in downturns (Rudowitz and Marks, 2008) .
Worse local labor market conditions have been shown to increase the demand for welfare (Hoynes, 2000) . Income and other characteristics that have been shown to influence a state's demand for government services are defined based on the previous literature (Poterba 1997; Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 1998; Card and Payne, 2002; Corcoran et al., 2004; Baicker and Gordon, 2006; Reed, 2006; Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2010; Lukens, 2014) . Specifically, we use an extensive set of socioeconomic control variables: real personal income net of government transfers per capita, median real household income, the homeownership rate, the housing price index, and the percentage of the population that is urban, below the poverty line, black, aged 0 to 5, aged 20 to 64, over 64 years of age, black aged 0 to 5, black aged over 64. We also include indicator variables for Democratic control of the legislature, Republican control of the legislature, Democratic governor, and school finance court order. 13 We also expect the state unemployment rate and the Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (FMAP) to affect welfare expenditures, and hence both of these variables are also included as controls. These variables are likely to determine federal assistance in a downturn. Federal grants to states are also specified as a dependent variable in the model, so we will be able to test whether revenue swings influence federal assistance after including an extensive set of controls. Finally, we include state and year fixed effects and, in some specifications, state trends, state gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, lags of the dependent and independent variables, and nonlinear functions of the controls.
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D. Summary Statistics
We focus primarily on state government spending and revenues. 15 In 2008, state expenditures comprised 66 percent of state and local expenditures, although this number was as high as 84 percent in Vermont, and as low as 46 percent in Nebraska. 16 Summary statistics in Table 1 show that states spent $4,400 per capita, with 63 percent of expenditures going to current expenditures on welfare, hospitals, health, and education. Thus, the expenditure categories of interest in our analysis also comprise a majority of overall state spending. Capital, interest, and transportation expenditures equal $691 per capita.
The other categories for expenditures are public safety, administration, unrestricted local support, and other.
17 Mean Medicaid spending is $13,074 per enrolled elderly and $1,739 per enrolled child. The total amount spent on grades K-12 is $1,608 per capita, with the state financing 48 percent of K-12 expenditures, and local governments financing 42 percent of expenditures.
The summary statistics also illustrate the growth in state government. Over the period of analysis, income per capita grew yearly by $285 (0.9 percent), while per capita state expenditures grew yearly by $83 (1.9 percent). The growth in state expenditures was financed by revenue swings ($29), enacted tax increases ($12), and intergovernmental grants ($39).
Figure 1 graphs positive and negative revenue swings for each state and year. 18 It can be seen that revenue swings are more volatile in low population states. Further, the three time periods where negative revenue swings are more frequent (1990-1991, 2002-2003, 2008-2009) A variety of factors can explain differences among states in revenue swings. First, changes in personal income in a state may not reflect national trends. Second, the relation between changes in income per capita and revenue swings differs by the form of state taxes (Mattoon and McGranahan, 2008) . Third, tax mixes affect the timing of the swings over the business cycle. Fourth, there are other changes to the economy that affect tax revenues -for instance, changes in realized capital gains, and shifts of consumer purchases from brick and mortar stores to the internet -and these factors are likely to vary among states. Fifth, state revenues may adjust to behavioral responses from changes in tax schedules in previous years. These behavioral responses are different, because states have enacted different changes in tax schedules and because the characteristics of the population affects the behavioral responses to tax changes (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012) .
The summary statistics in Table 1 provide further evidence of the large volatility in state revenues. Over our sample, the standard deviation of the change in personal income per capita is 3.1 percent of the mean value of personal income per capita (net of government transfers). 19 In contrast, the volatility of general revenues, revenues from state sources, and revenue from state sources net of enacted taxes are 4.4 percent (208/4,470), 5.1 percent (174/3,102), and 6.2 percent (191/3,102), respectively. Part of the volatility in personal income and revenue from state sources comes from growth. If 17 Other expenditures include environmental expenditures, lump sum contributions for employee fringe benefits, economic development, and government-wide insurance policies. 18 Revenue swings that exceed three times their standard deviation are omitted from the graph (North Dakota 2011 -2012 , Vermont 1999 , Wyoming 2006 . 19 Specifically, the standard deviation of the change in personal income is $917, the mean value of personal income per capita is $30,051, and 3.1 percent = 917/30,051. x negative revenue swings. Revenue swings that exceed three times their standard deviation are omitted from the graph (North Dakota 2008 , 2012 Vermont 1999; Wyoming 2006 Wyoming , 2008 Wyoming , 2010 . we detrend these variables, the volatility of these variables becomes 3 percent and 5.6 percent. Thus, the volatility of revenue from state sources is almost twice the volatility of income. In order to examine how much of the revenue swing can be predicted, we regress revenue swings on changes in socioeconomic characteristics (income per capita, income per capita squared, median household income, unemployment, unemployment squared, housing price index, homeownership, and the percentage of the population that is urban, below the poverty line, black, aged 0-5, aged 20-65, aged 65 or older, black aged 0-5, black aged 65 or older), income per capita times the change in income per capita, the FMAP, dummy variables for Democratic control of the legislature, Republican The variable "Unexplained revenue swing" is the residual from this regression. The standard deviation of unexplained revenue swings is 141/3,102 = 4.6 percent of the mean value of revenue from state sources. Thus, the extensive set of controls explain only (180−134)/180 = 26 percent of the revenue swings. In summary, it is unlikely that revenue swings can mostly be explained by changes in income and unemployment. Thus, in order to determine whether states respond asymmetrically to positive versus negative swings, it is essential to have a direct measure of revenue swings rather than rely on a proxy, such as the change in GDP or income per capita.
V. RESULTS
A. Main Results
The dependent variables in Panel A of Table 2 are the four budget components. All spending variables, whether they are dependent or independent variables, were divided by $1,000 to facilitate reporting of the coefficient estimates in Table 2 . We find that positive revenue swings lead to higher expenditures and balances, while negative revenue swings do not change expenditures but lead to lower balances. Further, when facing negative swings, states raise tax rates, and these rates do not revert to the original level when states subsequently experience positive revenue swings. Responses to changes in balances are symmetric: increases in balances lead states to increase spending and further increase balances, while decreases in balances lead states to decrease spending and further decrease balances.
Overall, a $1 positive revenue swing in period t increases expenditures in period t by $0.42, and increases balances in period t by $0.56. This increase in balances leads to 0.229 × $0.56 additional expenditures in period t + 1 and so on. The long-term effect of a $1 positive revenue swing is then to increase spending by $1.05 (see formula in Appendix B), with 95 percent confidence interval [0.84,1.27]. In contrast, the overall effect of a negative $1 revenue swing is to decrease spending by $0.70, with 95 percent confidence interval [0.42,0.98]. Thus, the overall increase in state spending of $82.75 between 1989 and 2012 (Table 1) is only partially due to revenue swings being positive on average over this period ($29.18 ). Even if economic booms and busts occurred with equal frequency and magnitude over time, state spending would gradually increase. This asymmetric response is consistent with the literature discussed in Section 3, which finds larger spending increases in upswings than spending cuts which occur during downturns.
Similarly, tax increases following a negative revenue swing are larger in the long run than in the short run. A $1 negative revenue swing in period t increases taxes in period t by $0.20, and decreases balances in period t by $0.66. This decrease in balances leads to 0.045 × $0.66 additional expenditures in period t + 1 and so on. The long-term effect of a $1 negative revenue swing is then to increase taxes by $0.31, with 95 percent confidence interval [0.19,0.44] . Neg. ∆Bal Neg. ∆Bal Neg. ∆Bal Neg. ∆Bal Neg. ∆Bal In order to determine which programs are targeted by expenditure increases and cuts, the dependent variables in Panel B are the components of general expenditures. For brevity, we report results for the seven largest program categories, which comprise 83 percent of total general expenditures. We find that in response to a positive $1 revenue swing, expenditures increase by $0.19 for education and $0.11 for Medicaid. Although a −$1 revenue swing does not reduce immediate expenditures, state balances fall by $0.66. Column 5 reveals that a −$1 change in balances results in $0.26 lower overall spending, including cuts of $0.11 for education, $0.05 for Medicaid, $0.03 for other health (other spending by the state health department), and $0.02 for public safety.
Two programs that are not cut are other welfare and hospital spending. 20 These results are consistent with our hypothesis in Section 2, that constraints limit states from cutting spending in some programs versus others, when revenues decline. Federal MOE Requirements limit spending cuts for TANF, 21 and states must maintain hospital spending for mental health patients involved with the criminal justice system. Although we find no tangible decline in other welfare spending per capita, the number of individuals seeking welfare is likely to rise in a downturn, putting strain on the amount of assistance available per beneficiary. Consistent with this story, we find that a $1 decline in balances reduced the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit available to a family of three by $0.03.
We also hypothesized that the soft constraint imposed by federal matching contribution requirements for Medicaid would limit Medicaid cuts during revenue shortfalls. In fact, decreases in Medicaid spending in response to a decline in balances are less than half the size of reductions in education spending.
Capital, interest, and transportation expenditures also remain constant after a decline in state balances, although a $1 increase in balances raises those expenditures by $0.04. These expenditures (particularly transportation) often use funds that have been earmarked for this purpose (e.g., through the sale of revenue bonds). These results serve as a validity check that our model is correctly distinguishing between budget components that are plausibly cut versus maintained during revenue shortfalls.
It is possible that the states with large negative revenue swings are those in which local governments are particularly capable of shielding their public finances from economic downturns. We lack data on enacted changes in taxes for local governments. However, we can approximate local revenue swings as the per capita real change in tax revenues between years as reported in the U.S. Census of State and Local Finances for 44,628 local governments. When we simultaneously compute the correlation between local government and state revenue swings by state and year, the correlation is only 0.0007. When only school districts are examined, the correlation is −0.0092. It is not surpris- 20 We may be concerned that the relation between the changes in balances and welfare expenditures would change with the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. However, we obtain qualitatively the same results when we examine the years before and after 1997. 21 TANF was designated as a block grant program in 1996, and states are required to spend an amount equal to at least 75 percent of the amount contributed by the federal government. The amount contributed by the federal government has not changed since 1996. In 2010, 14 states were within $10 million of their "maintenance of effort" minimum.
ing that state and local revenue swings are only weakly correlated, since local taxes are frequently property based, and state taxes are more commonly linked to income. One might suspect that expenditure cuts in response to declining balances would be related to the base share of each component in the overall budget. For example, mean annual education expenditures are almost two times larger than Medicaid expenditures, and the decrease in spending resulting from a $1 decline in balances reduces education spending by more than twice the reduction in Medicaid ($0.11 versus $0.05). In contrast, spending on other health and public safety, which on average comprise 3.7 percent and 4.4 percent of the budget, respectively, experience $0.03 and $0.02 decreases, respectively, in spending when balances decline by $1.
In response to the 2008 recession, the federal government passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which included $86.6 billion in funds for a temporary increase in the FMAP that states receive for Medicaid spending (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009 ). To receive the higher FMAP, states were forbidden from making their eligibility standards for Medicaid more restrictive. To test whether this policy intervention influences our estimates of the effects of downturns on education and Medicaid spending, we re-estimate both Equation (1) and the education and Medicaid spending regressions, excluding data from the years 2009 to 2012. In this case, we still find that negative revenue swings reduce balances; the coefficient changes from −0.663 to −0.810, 1 percent level significance. Declines in balances reduce education spending; the coefficient changes from −0.110 to −0.109 (1 percent level significance). Declines in balances continue to reduce Medicaid spending; the coefficient changes from −0.050 to −0.061 (1 percent significance level). Therefore, the change in FMAP rates during the Great Recession has little impact on our estimates.
We utilize data from multiple federal sources to investigate which subcomponents of Medicaid are most affected by downturns. Panel C of Table 2 shows that both the elderly and children experience cuts to Medicaid assistance in a delayed fashion. Negative revenue swings do not reduce the percent of elderly or children enrolled in Medicaid, or expenditures per beneficiary. However, a $1 decrease in balances reduces the proportion of elderly enrolled in Medicaid by 0.016 percentage points and expenditures per child beneficiary (ages 0 to 19) by $0.14. Thus, when a $222 negative revenue swing occurred in 2009 during the Great Recession, Medicaid enrollment and expenditures did not immediately decline. But the $147 decline in balances ($222 × −0.663) led to a reduction in the share of elderly enrolled in Medicaid of 2.35 percentage points in 2010 and a decrease in expenditures per child of $20.60.
The differences in Medicaid cuts between children and the elderly may be related to differences in services that states prefer for these two populations, combined with federal mandates. Most children enrolled in Medicaid (79 percent) receive coverage, because the federal government requires states to insure them. In contrast, only about 50 percent of elderly Medicaid recipients are enrolled because of federal requirements. 22 Thus, during downturns, states may have more discretion to reduce how many elderly receive Medicaid assistance versus how much each receives; and they also may have more latitude in determining how much each child recipient receives versus who is covered. 23 Further evidence of the importance of federal requirements can be obtained by examining Medicaid expenditure categories. We find that cuts to Medicaid expenditures per child are most tangible in the category of capitated expenditures. Prior to 2002, there was no minimum floor that states were required to set when reimbursing insurers for capitated care through Medicaid. Even after 2002, when states were required to set capitated rates that are "actuarially sound," many states reported that capitated rates would be targeted for cuts during the Great Recession (Courtot, Coughlin, and Lawton, 2012) .
We have one case in which we can measure the health implications of declines in state spending in response to revenue shortfalls. Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995) and Gray (2001) find that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates increase the likelihood of low-weight births. Consistent with these findings, our estimates suggest that a $1,000 decrease in revenues increases the percent of teen births that are low-weight by 0.323 percentage points. The magnitude of this effect implies that the $222 per capita negative revenue swing in 2009 increased the share of low-weight births to teen mothers by 0.07 (=(222/1,000) × 0.323) percentage points. In 2008, 9.6 percent of teen births were low-weight. These numbers suggest that the negative revenue swing raised the percent of low-weight births to teen mothers by close to 1 percent.
Looking in more detail at education spending, we find that in response to a $1 decrease in lagged balances, state K-12 expenditures decrease by $0.07. These cuts are only in part offset by changes in local expenditures as can be verified by looking at changes in total K-12 expenditures. A $1 decrease in lagged balances is associated with a reduction of total K-12 spending of $0.036 in year t and $0.028 in year t + 1. Perhaps because of these cuts, the number of pupils per teacher increases by 0.78/1,000 (see Panel D) . 24 This effect implies that the negative revenue swing that occurred in 2009 led to an increase of 0.001 = (222 × 0.663 × 0.008)/1000 in the number of pupils per teacher in 2010. This magnitude suggests that the large class size increases reported in the media during the Great Recession were not widespread (Landsberg, 2009) .
For brevity, we have omitted from the tables the coefficient estimates for all the control variables. 25 Since personal income affects several of the control variables (income per capita, median household income, poverty, FMAP), each variable is difficult to interpret in isolation. Also, since many of the control variables are slow moving, it is 23 The ARRA temporarily increased FMAP rates for state Medicaid programs, while requiring states to maintain eligibility requirements. However, states could cut optional services (e.g., dental services, physical therapy, prosthetic devices), and some elderly could have chosen not to enroll in Medicaid when these services were cut from the program. 24 We divide by 1,000 since the regression are in $1,000. 25 The coefficient estimates for all the control variables are available from the authors upon request. not surprising that they do not appear to have a major effect on our results. Nonetheless, including these control variables ensures that our results are robust to how we control for demand for government services.
B. Additional Results
Our results are robust to several alternative regression specifications, which for brevity, we do not include in the paper. 26 We estimate the model with alternative specifications for lagged balances (replacing lagged balances by the sum of previous years' revenue swings). Our main specification was estimated in first differences, which best accounts for correlation in unobservables over time. Nevertheless, we examined the estimates when all variables were expressed in levels and state fixed effects were added to Equation (1). 27 We also tried specifications when the first difference of each variable was differenced a second time, to determine whether rates of change in budget components influenced spending. We then re-estimated the model with two alternative measures of revenue swings. In one case, we specified all revenue swings in one explanatory variable, instead of distinguishing between positive and negative revenue swings. In the second case, we again distinguished between positive and negative revenue swings, but dummy variables indicate whether the swings were greater than $100 per capita or lower than −$100 per capita.
In each alternative specification we still find that negative revenue swings have an indirect negative effect on expenditures. These swings reduce balances, which in turn reduce spending. In some of these alternative specifications the coefficients on Medicaid and Education spending are not precisely estimated. However, these alternative specifications require a large reduction in sample size, which contributes to the fall in statistical precision. To account for the possibility that nonlinearities in economic factors that change during downturns may be captured by revenue swings, we estimated another set of regressions including both unemployment squared and income per capita squared. The estimates were similar to those reported in Table 2 . The statistical significance of the coefficients remained the same, and almost all changes in magnitude that occurred were at the third decimal point.
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a few outliers, we first reestimated Equation (1), which was population-weighted, dropping either of the two largest states by population in 1990. When we drop California from the sample, the sign on all coefficients showing the effects of revenue swings or changes in balances on the major budget components remains the same as reported in Panel A of Table 2 . The coefficient magnitudes are similar, and only one of the 16 coefficients changes in significance; a negative balance no longer increases taxes. When we instead drop New York from the sample, the approximate magnitude and significance of all the coefficients remains the same. When we drop either the first three years or the last three years from the sample, the magnitude of the coefficients is also similar, and the statistical precision of the coefficients remains the same. When we exclude the years in which recessions occurred (2001-2002 and 2008-2009) , the effect of a decline in balances on tax cuts and the effect of negative revenue swings on grant cuts are no longer precisely estimated. The effect of a negative revenue swing on balances falls from −0.663 to −0.432, but remains significant. The effect of a decline in balances on expenditure changes rises from −0.264 to −0.288. Therefore, removing data from the two recessions changes the results somewhat, but the implications for short-and long-term spending are similar. We also re-estimated Equation (1) without population weighting for each state. Two of the coefficients in Panel A of Table 2 that were imprecisely estimated become significant and two coefficients that were significant become imprecisely estimated. However, the effect of negative revenue swings on changes in balances remains significant (changing from −0.663 to −0.743), as does the effect of declines in balances on expenditures (changing from −0.264 to −0.217). If we continue with no population weighting but restrict the sample to states with populations of 1.2 million or more (which drops 10 states), only one coefficient from Panel A of Table 2 changes in precision (the effect of declines in balances on tax cuts). The magnitudes of the other coefficients remain similar to those from the original population-weighted sample. Coughlin and Zuckerman (2005) examine budget decisions in eight states in response to budget shortfalls following the 2001-2002 recession. They found that in order to delay making cuts to Medicaid, states leaned on a large number of one-time measures, such as depleting their rainy-day reserves. To ensure larger rainy day funds, McNichol and Boadi (2011) advocate that states have larger caps on the size of rainy day funds and set up rules that ensure deposits into the rainy day fund during favorable economic times. In order to examine the effectiveness of rainy day funds in limiting cuts, we interact our four main explanatory variables with average per capita rainy day funds in the state over our sample period. We find that states with higher average rainy day funds experience smaller cuts in Medicaid spending, in response to a $1 decrease in lagged balances. 28 Correspondingly, there are smaller decreases in the adjusted fraction of elderly enrolled in Medicaid in states with higher average rainy days funds, in response to a $1 decrease in lagged balances.
In our sample, 61 percent of the observations come from states with annual budget cycles, and the remaining from states with biennial budgets. We reran Equation (1) excluding the states with biennial budgets and obtained qualitatively similar results. The only coefficient that changed in statistical precision was the effect of declining balances on tax cuts, which became insignificant. The magnitude of the effects for the remaining variables was similar.
VI. DISCUSSION
During our sample period, education comprises the largest portion of state spending (33.3 percent) and Medicaid the second largest (17.2 percent). We hypothesized that states may be less reluctant to cut spending on Medicaid due to federal matching requirements, and because education has both federal and local alternative funding sources. We find larger cuts (nominal and proportional) in state spending for education versus Medicaid ($0.11 versus $0.05), when revenues decline, and the state cuts translate into overall reductions in education spending even when accounting for other revenue sources.
Even though Medicaid spending increased rapidly in 2008-2009, we find that reductions in state revenues led to cuts to Medicaid benefits. These apparently contradictory findings can be explained by the increasing demand for welfare that accompanies recessions, and by the intervening lags between decreases in personal income, decreases in state revenues, and reductions in state expenditures. We are able to separately identify these factors because we have a direct measure for decreases in state revenues ("revenue swings"), and because states have very different tax structures.
Specifically, we find that state revenue shortfalls led to lower Medicaid enrollment rates by the elderly and to reduced spending per child beneficiary, particularly in the categories of capitated and drug spending. The decrease in Medicaid benefits could be interpreted as an indirect tax if it leads to heavier reliance on out-of-pocket spending and on hospitals' internal cross subsidies.
However, studies have found that cuts in Medicaid have been associated with cuts in medical care. For instance, Zerzan et al. (2007) surveyed enrollees in the Oregon Medically Needy program. Six months after its elimination, 75 percent had skipped or stopped medications. Sen et al. (2012) examine the effect of copayment increases in Alabama's Children's Health Insurance Program. They find declines in utilization for inpatient care, physician visits, brand-name medications, and emergency department visits. Moreover, Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995) and Gray (2001) find that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates increase infant mortality and the likelihood of low-weight births. Thus, these studies suggest that Medicaid cuts have a negative impact on health. Consistent with this prediction, we find that negative revenue swings are associated with an increase in the percent of teen mothers with low-weight births. Thus, the cuts in Medicaid benefits appear to have short-and long-term consequences.
Other studies have shown that state budgetary rules lead to expenditures cuts in response to fiscal shocks (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994) . However, these studies have not examined particular health programs. For instance, Alt and Lowry (1994) find larger expenditure cuts in states that have stricter balanced budget requirements and divided government. We are able to show the same results for the Medicaid enrollment rates of the elderly and for Medicaid spending per enrolled child (i.e., there are larger Medicaid cuts in state that have stricter balanced budget requirements and divided government). Thus our study is able to show that budgetary rules affect populations at risk. Our results are also consistent with a broader literature, which measures state fiscal responses to exogenous changes in spending requirements for social programs. In response to federally mandated increases in spending requirements for Medicaid, states pared back other welfare spending, such as low-income energy assistance or foster care (Baicker, 2001) . In response to federal court orders forcing increases in correctional spending, states reduced welfare cash expenditures (Boylan and Mocan, 2014) .
Our analyses cannot determine whether states are spending too little or too much on health and social services. A summary of the health care literature by Skinner (2012) finds multiple studies that identify either a positive or negative association between spending on health care or hospital care across regions and health outcomes. Skinner (2012) concludes that it is less important how much money is spent, and far more important whether resources are spent on effective or ineffective treatments. In fact, in the two cases in which we are able to quantify the effects of a negative revenue swing in nonmonetary terms, the effects appear to be relatively small. The $222 negative revenue swing in 2009 is estimated to have increased the proportion of low-weight teen births by 1 percent and raised the ratio of pupils to teachers in K-12 by 0.0001. Despite the estimated spending cuts that occurred to Medicaid and education during the Great Recession, health and education officials may have been able to shift resources in a manner that protected specific high-priority programs. However, we were only able to collect long time series on two tangible outcomes. As richer data sources become available in future years, estimation of the effect of negative revenue swings should be revisited. 
In Section V.B, we estimate the model in first differences with an additional lag of the main explanatory variables: 
